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UNJUST ENRICHMENT: AN ALTERNATIVE TO TORT 
LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CLIMATE CHANGE 
CONTEXT?  
Aura Weinbaum† 
Abstract: It is generally accepted within the scholarly international community 
that global climate change is occurring and is due at least in part to anthropogenic 
activity.  Strategies to mitigate climate change harms and adapt to inevitable climate 
change-induced consequences are influencing legal, political, and human rights 
frameworks.  Thus far, international litigation attempts to hold emitters accountable have 
been unsuccessful: Tuvalu’s threat to sue the United States and Australia at the 
International Court of Justice, and the Inuit’s petition to the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights were both hampered by procedural and substantive legal issues.   
Perhaps in response, the United Nations and a range of other actors have taken steps since 
2005 to enhance the linkages between climate change and human rights as a way to 
augment the obligations of states to protect their citizens and enhance international 
cooperation in addressing climate change.  While necessary in the grand scheme, this 
progress does not immediately create a remedy for some Small Island Developing States 
(“SIDS”), such as Tuvalu.  This comment argues that tort and human rights-based 
litigation may not be the most effective approach for SIDS facing the dire consequences 
of climate change.  Rather, SIDS may benefit from pursuing compensation based on 
unjust enrichment, focusing on benefits conferred on emitters rather than harms caused or 
rights violated.  If successful, unjust enrichment litigation would allow these States to 
avoid the specific proximate cause, cause-in-fact, and sanction requirements associated 
with torts, and the legal obligation and enforcement problems associated with the process 
of developing and clarifying human rights law, while simultaneously securing necessary 
funding to implement adaptation strategies. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The projections described by the International Panel on Climate 
Change (“IPCC”) reveal an anticipated incongruity in climate change 
impacts across the globe.1  In particular, Small Island Developing States, 
(“SIDS”) such as the country of Tuvalu, will suffer disproportionately from 
the impacts of climate change.2  Importantly, SIDS such as Tuvalu have 
contributed to the movement to draw linkages between human rights and 
                                           
†
 The author would like to thank the editorial staff of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal and 
other reviewers for their guidance and support. 
1
 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE 
CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY: CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE 
FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 7-22 (M.L. 
Parry et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2007), available at  
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-spm.pdf. 
2
 See, e.g., Ruth Gordon, The Climate of Environmental Justice: Taking Stock: Climate Change and 
the Poorest Nations: Further Reflections on Global Warming, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1559, 1593-95 (2007). 
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climate change,3 and have also contributed to attempts to build tort-based 
international climate change case law,4 yet these developments have not 
produced any form of compensation for the country.  Without the requisite 
funding to take immediate action, SIDS such as Tuvalu may face the 
destruction of their environment and livelihood,5 with no feasible plan for 
adaptation.  
This comment argues that countries such as Tuvalu may wish to 
pursue compensation to pay for adaptation strategies in international 
tribunals and domestic courts using the principle of unjust enrichment.  Part 
II provides a synopsis of prevailing scientific analysis in support of climate 
change, contextualizes the climate change impacts experienced by Tuvalu, 
and identifies two existing policy responses to climate change.  Part III 
considers the inadequate application of tort and human rights frameworks to 
the SIDS context.  Part IV discusses the principle of unjust enrichment, its 
existence in international law, its applicability to the Tuvaluan context, and 
potential challenges SIDS may face in pursuing claims under this legal 
theory.    
II. FOR SOME SIDS, MITIGATION AND ADAPTATION STRATEGIES ALONE 
CANNOT ADDRESS THE THREATS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
Scientists researching climate change emphasize that climate change 
stresses differ among every climatic zone.6  SIDS are particularly at risk and 
will suffer disproportionately from the impacts of climate change.7  The 
capacity for countries to adapt to their unique climate change-related 
experience depends on a number of factors, including economic and natural 
resource circumstances, “social networks, entitlements, institutions and 
governance, human resources, and technology.”8  Because SIDS tend to lack 
                                           
3
 See Marc Limon, Human Rights and Climate Change: Constructing a Case for Political Action, 
33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 439, 444 n.27 (2009).  
4
 See, e.g., Katherine McGrow, ‘Climate refugee’ nation Tuvalu ponders legal options against 
polluters, PACIFIC.SCOOP, Sept. 9, 2009, http://pacific.scoop.co.nz/2009/09/climate-refugee-nation-tuvalu-
ponders-legal-options-against-polluters/.  
5
 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 2, at 1597.  
6
 See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Ch. 17: Assessment of adaptation 
practices, options, constraints and capacity, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND 
VULNERABILITY: CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 720 (M.L. Parry et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 
2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapter17.pdf.  Examples 
of “climatic zones” include “dryland, floodplains, mountains, Arctic, and so on.”  Id. 
7
 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 2, at 1593-95. 
8
 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 6, at 719. 
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many of these adaptive factors, it is likely that climate change adaptation 
will be particularly challenging for such countries.9 
A. Human-Caused Climate Change and Associated Sea Level Rise 
Threaten SIDS 
Scientific analysis attributes climate change to human activity.   
Representing much of the scientific community, the IPCC10 defines climate 
change as “any change in climate over time, whether due to natural 
variability or as a result of human activity.”11  Even so, the Third Assessment 
Report of the IPCC establishes that human activity, and particularly 
greenhouse gas emissions (“GHGs”), is the driving force behind global 
warming.12  The IPCC predicts that current trends in global warming will 
exacerbate the number of people suffering from disease, hunger, 
malnutrition, and death; and injury from heat waves, floods, storms, fires, 
and drought.13   
                                           
9
 See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Ch. 16: Small islands, in 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY: CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP 
II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (M.L. 
Parry et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapter16.pdf.  
10
 The IPCC’s reports represent the most comprehensive and accepted data on the subject of climate 
change.  Specifically, the IPCC states:  “[t]he Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was set 
up jointly by the World Meteorological Organization and the United Nations Environment Programme to 
provide an authoritative international statement of scientific understanding of climate change.  The IPCC’s 
periodic assessments of the causes, impacts and possible response strategies to climate change are the most 
comprehensive and up-to-date reports available on the subject, and form the standard reference for all 
concerned with climate change in academia, government and industry worldwide.  Through three working 
groups, many hundreds of international experts assess climate change in this Fourth Assessment Report.”  
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Introduction to the Working Group II Fourth 
Assessment Report, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY: 
CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE i (M.L. Parry et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2007), available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-intro.pdf. 
11
 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE 
CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS: A REPORT OF WORKING GROUP I OF THE 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 2 n.1 (S. Solomon et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 
2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1-spm.pdf. 
12
 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE 
CHANGE 2001: THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS: CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE THIRD ASSESSMENT 
REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 10 (J.T. Houghton et al. eds., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 2001), available at  http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/wg1/pdf/WG1_TAR-
FRONT.pdf (“ . . . there is new and stronger evidence that most of the . . . warming observed over the last 
50 years is attributable to human activities.”). 
13
 John H. Knox, Essay, Climate Change and Human Rights Law, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 163, 165 (2009) 
(citing INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, 
ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 393 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2007)).   
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Furthermore, the global scientific community agrees that 
anthropogenic sea level rise will affect millions of people living near coasts.   
Coastal zones will experience significant erosion and other risks due to 
climate change and sea level rise.14  Coastal flooding alone, without 
intervention, may grow more than tenfold by 2080, thereby affecting over 
100 million people per year.15  To make matters worse, the IPCC anticipates 
continuously rising sea levels, cyclone intensification, and intensification of 
storm surges.16   
SIDS are particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and 
will suffer disproportionately from its impacts.17  Their extreme vulnerability 
is due both to economic and geographic circumstances.18  Many SIDS face 
economic disadvantages associated with remoteness, susceptibility to natural 
disasters, and heavy dependence on international trade, and on local natural 
resources.19  In addition, twelve of the fifty-one SIDS are categorized under 
the United Nations as Least Developed Countries, a circumstance which 
further exacerbates their difficulty in responding to climate change in an 
adequate manner.20   
SIDS’ geographic context contributes to their climate change impact 
vulnerability because they are increasingly exposed to and influenced by 
large ocean-atmospheric interactions; shifts in severe weather such as El 
Niño, monsoons, cyclones, and hurricanes; and sea-level rise.21  Sea level 
rise is particularly alarming for SIDS as many of these islands rise less than 
four meters above sea level.22  The 2007 assessment of the IPCC projected a 
                                           
14
 See id. (citing INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: 
IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 317 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2007)).   
15
  INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Ch. 6: Coastal Systems and Low-Lying 
Areas, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY: CONTRIBUTION OF 
WORKING GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE 339 (M.L. Parry Et al. eds, Cambridge Univ. Press 2007), available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapter6.pdf. 
16
 See Knox, supra note 13, at 165 (citing INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 317 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2007)).   
17
 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 2.  
18
 See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 9. 
19
 See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], Vulnerability and Adaptation to 
Climate Change in Small Island Developing States: Background paper for the expert meeting on 
adaptation for small island developing States, 4 (2007), available at 
http://unfccc.int/files/adaptation/adverse_effects_and_response_measures_art_48/application/pdf/200702_s
ids_adaptation_bg.pdf. 
20
 See id.  
21
 Id.  
22
 Alexander Gillespie, Small Island States in the Face of Climate Change: The End of the Line in 
International Environmental Responsibility, 22 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 107, 113 (2003/2004) (citing 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, IPCC TECHNICAL PAPER V: CLIMATE CHANGE AND 
BIODIVERSITY 34 (Habiba Gitay et al. eds., 2002)). 
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sea level rise of 0.19 meters to 0.58 meters by the end of the century.23  
Newer studies predict a more drastic scenario:  an increase in sea level rise 
of 0.5 and 1 meter by 2100.24  Rising sea levels have immediate 
consequences for small island states:  infrastructure and settlements are often 
located near the shore, and are thus threatened by rising waters.25  The IPCC 
has found that islands face increasing “frequency and severity of flooding 
from sea surges . . . ; eroding beaches undermine fishing and tourism, two 
critical economic bases for most small island states . . . .  [Additionally,] 
their freshwater resources are likely to be ‘seriously compromised’ as a 
result of rising sea levels and reduced rainfall in summer months.”26  
Therefore, SIDS face tremendous degradation of the island environments 
upon which their economies rely, which in turn also suffer and decline.27  
Ultimately, SIDS may face total destruction and the end of their existence as 
communities.28  
Thus, countries such as Tuvalu, with significant coastal exposure, will 
likely experience many of the negative consequences anticipated by the 
IPCC.  A particularly offensive component to this scenario is the fact that 
SIDS emit less than 1.5% as much GHGs as do industrial countries.29  
Despite the fact that SIDS have contributed very little to climate change, 
they will suffer disproportionately from its negative impacts.30  
Consequently, they will be forced to shoulder the burden of activities for 
which they are not responsible.  
B. A Case Study on SIDS: Tuvalu Faces Particularly Threatening Risks 
Due to Climate Change 
Tuvalu’s geography makes it particularly vulnerable to sea level rise.   
The country is located between Hawaii and Australia and is one of nine 
atolls in the South Pacific comprising the Oceana island group.31  It is 
                                           
23
 John H. Knox, Symposium, Linking Human Rights and Climate Change at the United Nations, 33 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 477, 479 (citing IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND 
VULNERABILITY 323-24 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2007)). 
24
 Id. (citing A Sinking Feeling, ECONOMIST, Mar. 14, 2009, at 82).  
25
 See id. at 479-80 (citing IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND 
VULNERABILITY 689, 701 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2007)). 
26
 Id. at 480 (citing IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 
689, 695, 697, 701 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2007)). 
27
 See Gordon, supra note 2, at 1597.  
28
 Id. 
29
 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], Climate Change: Small Island 
Developing States 9 (2005), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/cc_sids.pdf. 
30
 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 2, at 1593.  
31
 See Henry W. McGee, Jr., Litigating Global Warming: Substantive Law in Search of a Forum, 16 
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 371, 382 (2005). 
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“composed entirely of reef islands on atolls and table reefs and is thus highly 
vulnerable to inundation and coastal erosion, particularly in light of expected 
future rises in seal level.”32  Tuvalu covers twenty-six square kilometers, 
with twenty-four kilometers of coastline, and a population of approximately 
11,000.33  Its highest point lies just five meters above sea level.34  In 2000, 
Tuvalu appealed to neighboring Australia and New Zealand to take in its 
citizens if rising sea levels should make the country uninhabitable,35 but its 
efforts were unsuccessful.36   
Meanwhile, Tuvalu continues to face the problems of sea-level rise 
head-on.  Recently, Tuvalu’s capital island, Fongafale islet of Funafuti Atoll, 
flooded during spring high tides.37  In 1997, the islet of Tepuka Savilivili 
was struck by three cyclones.38  An estimated 6.7% of Tuvalu’s land was 
removed and washed away by these cyclones, including the islet’s vegetation 
cover.  One study posits that sea-level in the Tuvalu region is rising, based 
on data which suggests that relative sea-level rise at Funafuti, Tuvalu was 
2 േ 1 milimeter per year over the years spanning 1950 to 2001.39  Clearly, 
such trends should not be ignored.  
Tuvalu’s National Adaptation Programme of Action (“NAPA”)40 
identifies key environmental climate change stresses in six significant 
sectors: coastal zones, soils, water resources, land and the marine 
                                           
32
 Hiroya Yamano et al., Atoll Island Vulnerability to Flooding and Inundation Revealed by 
Historical Reconstruction: Fongafale Islet, Funafuti Atoll, Tuvalu, 57 GLOBAL & PLANETARY CHANGE 
407, 409 (2007). 
33
 See CIA World Factbook: Tuvalu, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/tv.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2010). 
34
 Id.  
35
 Id. 
36
 Australia has effectively closed its doors to Tuvalu, while New Zealand has agreed to admit a 
maximum of 75 Tuvaluans per year, “who must be ‘of good character and health, have basic English skills, 
have a job offer in New Zealand, and be under 45 years of age.’”  Rosemary Rayfuse, W(h)ither Tuvalu? 
International Law and Disappearing States, 9 U.N.S.W. Law Research Paper No. 9, 9 (2009), available at 
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1151&context=unswwps. 
37
 Yamano, supra note 32, at 408. 
38
 Kennedy Warne, Tuvalu: drowning or waving: the low-lying islands of the Pacific Nation of 
[Tuvalu] have long been seen as the most likely victims of global climate change. And already, several 
islands are experiencing regular episodes of flooding. But is there any truth behind the headline stories of 
an imminent exodus?, 80 GEOGRAPHICAL 54, 55-56 (2008). 
39
 John A. Church, Neil J. White & John R. Hunter, Sea-Level Rise at tropical Pacific and Indian 
Ocean Islands, 53 GLOBAL & PLANETARY CHANGE 155, 164, 166 (2006). 
40
 The UNFCCC describes National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) as plans that 
“provide a process for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) to identify priority activities that respond to their 
urgent and immediate needs to adapt to climate change—those for which further delay would increase 
vulnerability and/or costs at a later stage.”  UNFCCC, National Adaptation Programmes of Action, 
http://unfccc.int/national_reports/napa/items/2719.php (last visited Oct. 28, 2010).  
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environment, agriculture, and health.41  Tuvalu’s NAPA also predicts that 
climate change and variability will adversely affect biophysical processes in 
the following ways: 
The vulnerability of communities to impacts [of] climate 
change, sea level rise and extreme event[s] will increase due to 
the lack of national economic resources and limited investment 
capacity, the high dependency of communities on natural 
resources, and the lack of institutional capacity to address 
climate change . . . .  Increasing intensity of climate change 
impacts will significantly decrease fruit tree yields, especially 
the breadfruit and coconut trees.  Thus, availability of nutritious 
domestic foods will be at risk in the future, affecting the 
livelihood of the people who depend solely on the natural 
resource base . . . .42 
Furthermore, due to climate change and sea level rise, Tuvalu has already 
observed: 
a) High groundwater level[s] during high rainfall intensities and 
rising sea level; b) High incidences of water scarcity due to 
high frequency of low rainfall days and prolonged drought, 
especially in highly populated areas such as Funafuti; c) 
Decrease in agricultural productivity due to pest and fruit flies 
infestation; d) Decrease in coral and lagoon fisheries 
productivity due to the high soil erosion burying adjacent 
corals; e) Increasing severity of coastal erosion; f) Increasing 
and wider saltwater intrusion into coastal areas and pulaka pits; 
and g) Coastal flooding and inundation.43 
Thus, the island nation of Tuvalu has experienced and will continue to 
experience severe problems associated with climate change, which may 
ultimately force the country to relocate its population.44 
                                           
41
 TUVALU DEP’T. OF ENV’T., MINISTRY OF NAT. RES.,  ENV’T., AG., AND LANDS,  TUVALU’S 
NATIONAL ADAPTATION PROGRAMME OF ACTION 19 (2007), http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/napa/tuv01.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 28, 2010).  
42
 Id. at 21.  
43
 Id. at 21-22. 
44
 Tuvalu has already been in discussion with Australia and New Zealand about relocating its 
citizens.  See Rayfuse, supra note 36, at 9. 
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C. Room for Improvement: Complementary Policy Responses to Climate 
Change  
Two complementary strategies, mitigation and adaptation, dominate 
the policy responses to climate change.  Much of the debate around climate 
change has, until fairly recently, dealt with the mitigation of GHGs.45  In 
2001, the IPCC Third Assessment Report produced by IPCC Working Group 
II argued that mitigation and adaptation should be developed simultaneously 
in the global response to climate change.46  The ensuing Report determined 
that “adaptation is a necessary strategy at all scales to complement climate 
change mitigation efforts,” and “those with the least resources have the least 
capacity to adapt and are the most vulnerable.”47  Policy responses to climate 
change have thus focused on these two strategies.   
Mitigation includes reducing GHGs in an effort to abate and prevent 
the further exacerbation of climate change.48  Mitigation efforts employ 
strategies to enhance the removal of GHGs by creating GHG “sinks.”49  
Such GHG sinks refer to “forests, vegetation or soils that can reabsorb 
CO2”50 or “process[es], activit[ies] or mechanism[s] which remove[] a 
greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas from the 
atmosphere.”51  International efforts at mitigation include the Kyoto 
Protocol,52 followed by the non-binding Copenhagen Accord.53  Because 
                                           
45
 According to the IPCC, “Greenhouse gases effectively absorb thermal infrared radiation, emitted 
by the Earth’s surface, by the atmosphere itself due to the same gases, and by clouds.  Atmospheric 
radiation is emitted to all sides, including downward to the Earth’s surface.  Thus greenhouse gases trap 
heat within the surface-troposphere system.  This is called the greenhouse effect.”  INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL 
SCIENCE BASIS, GLOSSARY: A REPORT OF WORKING GROUP I OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE,  946 (A.P.M. Baede, ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2007), available at  http://www.ipcc-
wg1.unibe.ch/publications/wg1-ar4/ar4-wg1-annexes.pdf. 
46
 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE 
CHANGE 2001: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY: CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE 
THIRD ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (Cambridge Univ. 
Press 2001), available at http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/wg2/pdf/wg2TARspm.pdf. 
47
 Id.  
48
 IAN BURTON, ELLIOT DIRINGER & JOEL SMITH, ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE: 
INTERNATIONAL POLICY OPTIONS 1 (2006), available at 
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/PEW_Adaptation.pdf. 
49
 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], Fact Sheet: The need for mitigation 
1 (Nov. 2009), available at 
http://unfccc.int/files/press/backgrounders/application/pdf/press_factsh_mitigation.pdf. 
50
 Id.  
51
 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], article 1(8), U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/INFORM/84, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, (May 9, 1992), available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf. 
52
 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Chapter 1: Introduction, in CLIMATE 
CHANGE 2007: CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE 
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some major emitters refuse to curb their GHG emissions, mitigation may 
only contribute to the prevention of further climate change (or at least, 
limiting the cumulative effects of ongoing emissions) rather than reversing 
climate change.54 
Adaptation, on the other hand, concerns the efforts of states to cope 
with the impacts of climate change that cannot be avoided.55  Adaptation 
measures encompass a number of strategies to avoid the negative 
environmental and human tolls of climate change.56  Historically, measures 
to cope with weather and climate-related impacts have included crop 
diversification, irrigation, water management, disaster risk management, and 
insurance.57  Recent adaptation studies have examined more drastic adaptive 
strategies focused on migration, resettlement, and relocation.58  Increasingly, 
countries with coastal areas are exploring innovative adaptation practices in 
response to rising sea levels and increased storm surges—for example, 
enhancing coastal infrastructure, constructing cyclone-resistant buildings, 
“capacity building for shoreline defense system design,” instituting coastal 
realignment programs, and encouraging coastal landowners to “act in ways 
that anticipate sea-level rise.”59  Notably, the IPCC report comments that 
development and implementation of adaptation measures face considerable 
“environmental, economic, informational, social, attitudinal and behavioral 
                                                                                                                              
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 97 (B. Metz et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2007), 
available at  http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg3/ar4-wg3-chapter1.pdf.  Countries that have 
ratified the Kyoto Protocol have agreed to reduce their carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, sulfur 
hexafluoride, hydrofluorocarbon, and perfluorocarbon emissions.  Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change Annex A, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/L.7/Add.1 (Dec. 10, 
1997).  As of October 2010, 191 countries and the European Union have signed and ratified the Protocol. 
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php (last visited Oct. 20, 2010) 
[hereinafter Kyoto Status of Ratification].  The United States has signed but has not ratified the Kyoto 
Protocol.  Id.  The Kyoto Protocol expires in 2012, and the U.N. Climate Change Conference in 
Copenhagen, held in December 2009, was intended to produce the successor to the Kyoto Protocol.  See 
Daniel Bodansky, Current Development: The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: A Postmortem, 
104 AM. J. INT’L. L. 230, 230 (2010). 
53
 The non-binding Accord “does not establish emissions reduction targets . . . nor does it establish a 
deadline for the signing of a binding international agreement that would do so.”  Hannah Chang, 
International Executive Agreements on Climate Change, 35 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 337, 338-39 (2010).  
Additionally, the Accord relies on domestic actions to establish emissions targets for developed countries, 
while, for example, the United States cannot pledge any emissions reduction targets without passing 
corresponding climate legislation.  Id. 
54
 See Jason A. Lowe et. al., How difficult is it to recover from dangerous levels of global warming?, 
4 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS. 1, 8 (2009). 
55
 See BURTON, supra note 48. 
56
 Id.  
57
 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 6, at 719.  
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barriers,” and that developing states are further hampered by a lack of 
available resources and insufficient adaptive capacity.60  Thus, some 
developing states that have contributed the least to GHGs are now in the 
precarious position of facing some of the most drastic adaptation strategies, 
with relatively few resources to do so.61 
III. TORT LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORKS MAY NOT MEET THE 
IMMEDIATE NEEDS OF SIDS’ CLIMATE CHANGE VICTIMS 
Two case studies demonstrate that attempts to litigate international 
climate change claims based in tort law and human rights violations are 
unlikely to be successful.  This is due in part to the fact that these 
frameworks do not adequately contemplate the unique and novel situations 
faced by climate change victims.  Tort claims are subject to attenuated causal 
chains, thus making them difficult to prove in court.  Human rights-based 
frameworks for addressing climate change are still in preliminary stages and 
are not yet developed enough to be practical for the particular adaptation 
context faced by worst-case scenario island nations. 
A. International Litigation Responses to Climate Change Have 
Employed Tort Law and Human Rights with Little Success  
Two of the most publicized instances of attempted climate change 
litigation employed tort law and human rights claims.  The tort claim, 
announced by Tuvalu in 2002, consisted of a threat to sue the United States 
and Australia for those countries’ contributions to the harms caused by 
emitting GHGs.  The second, beginning in 2005, involved the Inuit 
Circumpolar Council’s (“ICC”) petition submitted by Sheila Watt-Cloutier to 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (“IACHR”).   
Unfortunately, both concluded without legal success:  Tuvalu’s threat to sue 
never materialized, and the IACHR decided against processing the petition.   
1. Tuvalu’s Threat to Sue the United States and Australia Contemplated a 
Tort Claim Before the International Court of Justice 
The Kyoto Protocol binds ratifying countries to specific reduction 
goals for GHGs.62  Although the United States and Australia participated in 
                                           
60
 Daniel A. Farber, Adapting to Climate Change: Who Should Pay, 23 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 
16 (2007). 
61
 See, e.g., Gordon supra note 2, at 1593-95. 
62
 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 
37 I.L.M. 22 (1998).  See also Gordon, supra note 2, at 1586.  
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Protocol drafting negotiations and agreed symbolically to certain reductions 
in emissions, neither country had ratified the Protocol by 2002.63  Thus, 
although the Protocol became effective, it remained non-binding upon two 
of the biggest emitters in the world. 
According to some accounts, under former Prime Minister Koloa 
Talake, Tuvalu began preparing to sue the United States and Australia in 
2002 in the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) for failing to ratify the 
Kyoto Protocol, and contributing to the rising sea levels experienced by the 
country.64  Some descriptions of the threat to sue allude to a lawsuit based in 
negligence.65  Other accounts point more generally to a tort liability-based 
theory using such language as “specific causation” and “responsibility,” or 
“wrongfully caused or will cause damage,”66 all of which conjure the 
concepts of wrongful acts that result in injury associated with tort 
frameworks.  The apparent motivation for the lawsuit was to generate funds 
in damages and to relocate its population.67  A law firm in Melbourne had 
advised the country to pursue its claims for compensation in the ICJ.68  
Prime Minister Talake announced that Kiribati and the Maldives would join 
the lawsuit.69  However, Tuvalu’s subsequent Prime Minister, Saufatu 
Sopoanga, dropped the suit before it could materialize.70 
2. The Inuit Circumpolar Council Unsuccessfully Contemplated a 
Human Rights Claim 
Yet another heavily publicized attempt at climate change litigation 
involved the Inuit and the ICC human rights-based petition in 2005.  To date, 
                                           
63
 Rebecca Jacobs, Treading Deep Waters: Substantive Law Issues in Tuvalu’s Threat to Sue the 
United States in the International Court of Justice, 14 PAC. RIM. L. & POL’Y J. 103, 114 (2005).  Australia 
has since ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2007.  See Kyoto Status of Ratification, supra note 52. 
64
 Akiko Okamatsu, Problems and Prospects of International Legal Disputes on Climate Change 1, 
Berlin Conference on the Human Rights Dimensions of Global Environmental Change, Dec. 2, 2005, 
available at http://www.sprep.org/att/IRC/eCOPIES/Countries/Tuvalu/47.pdf; see also Warne, supra note 
38, at 55. 
65
 See, e.g., Jennifer Kilinski, Comment, International Climate Change Liability: A Myth or A 
Reality?, 18 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 377, 393 n.75 (2009). 
66
 See, e.g., McGrow, supra note 4; Joyeeta Gupta, Legal Steps Outside the Climate Convention: 
Litigation as a Tool to Address Climate Change, 16 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INTL. ENVTL L. 76, 78 
(2007). 
67
 See Leslie Allen, Will Tuvalu Disappear Beneath the Sea?, SMITHSONIAN MAG., Aug., 2004, at 5.  
68
 See Mark Chipperfield, Drowning Islands of Tuvalu Sue UK Government to Stay Afloat., THE 
SCOTSMAN PUBLICATIONS LTD, Apr. 7, 2002. 
69
 Tiny Pacific Nation Takes On Australia, BBC NEWS, Mar. 4, 2002, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1854118.stm (last visited Oct. 30, 2010). 
70
 See McGrow, supra note 4. 
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the ICC71 petition submitted by Sheila Watt-Cloutier to the IACHR72 is the 
only concrete legal claim taken to an international tribunal on behalf of 
climate change victims.73  The petition represented the American and 
Canadian Inuit.74  It alleged that the United States had continuously violated 
the petitioners’ human rights by failing to limit its GHG emissions.75  The 
petition linked the impacts of climate change on Inuit life to human rights, 
including the “rights to life, health, property, cultural identity, and self 
determination.”76  While the Commission did hold a hearing on the 
connection between human rights and climate change in March 2007, it 
determined that it would not process the petition, stating that “the 
information provided does not enable us to determine whether the alleged 
facts would tend to characterize a violation of [protected human] rights.”77  
No further action has been taken by the Commission since the hearing.78  
While the petition was not legally successful, it has been recognized for 
publicizing the link between human rights and climate change. 
B. Tort Law Is an Inadequate Basis for International Climate Change 
Litigation Due to the Complexity of Causal Chains in Climate Change 
Cases and Other Procedural Hurdles  
Tort law is a problematic basis for international climate change 
litigation primarily due to the complexity of establishing the requisite 
elements of tort liability in relation to the complex causal chain of climate 
change and associated harms.  These substantive issues, in addition to other 
                                           
71
 The ICC “is an international non-governmental organization representing about 150,000 Inuit in 
Alaska, Canada, Greenland (Denmark), and Chukotka (Russia).”  Timo Koivurova, International Legal 
Avenues to Address the Plight of Victims of Climate Change: Problems and Prospects, 22 J. ENVTL. L. & 
LITIG. 267, 285 (2007) (citing INUIT CIRCUMPOLAR COUNCIL, INUIT CIRCUMPOLAR CONFERENCE, 
http://inuitcircumpolar.com/index.php?ID=16&Lang=En&Parent ID=16). 
72
 The IACHR is “one of two bodies in the Inter-American system for the promotion and protection 
of human rights . . . .  The IACHR is an autonomous organ of the Organization of American States (OAS).”   
Organization of American States: Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,  
http://www.cidh.oas.org/what.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2010). 
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 Id.  (citing INUIT CIRCUMPOLAR CONFERENCE, PETITION TO THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION 
ON HUMAN RIGHTS SEEKING RELIEF FROM VIOLATIONS RESULTING FROM GLOBAL WARMING CAUSED BY 
ACTS AND OMISSIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1 (2005), available at 
http://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/files/uploads/icc-files/FINALPetitionICC.pdf). 
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 Limon, supra note 3, at 441.  Specifically, as the world’s leading emitter of GHGs at the time, the 
petitioners alleged that the United States was violating human rights by failing to alter its climate change 
policies and by not ratifying the Kyoto Protocol.  See Joanna Harrington, Climate Change, Human Rights, 
and the Right to Be Cold, 18 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 513, 513 (2007). 
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 Knox, supra note 13, at 191.  
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 Knox, supra note 23, at 482. 
78
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procedural issues, support the proposition that Tuvalu’s lawsuit against the 
United States and Australia in the ICJ would have failed.79 
1. Tuvalu Would Face a Number of Substantive Legal Hurdles in a Claim 
Based in Tort Liability Brought Before the ICJ 
To establish a claim of negligence, a plaintiff must prove that the 
defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care, that the duty was breached, and 
that the breach was the cause of the damage claimed by the claimant.80  The 
most obvious drawback of tort liability-based climate change litigation is the 
complexity of establishing a causal link between a particular emitter and a 
particular country’s experience of climate change.  One scholar has 
identified a potential climate change causal link as approaching the 
following: 
1) companies produce fuels, power, engines, and other 
products; 2) consumer use of these goods and products 
generates carbon dioxide emissions, which rise into the 
atmosphere; 3) the emissions combine with other greenhouse 
gas emissions to warm the Earth via the greenhouse effect; 4) 
this warming causes sea levels to rise, permafrost to thaw, and 
sea ice to melt and thin; and 5) these effects cause damage to 
plaintiffs’ property.  Arguably, this end result has been 
foreseeable for several years.81 
Clearly, such a complex causal chain carries with it an arduous burden of 
proof, and presents significant opportunities for failure. 
Tracing harms and apportioning damages among multiple defendants 
would be difficult under a climate change fact pattern.  Tracing harms in the 
climate change scenario is particularly complicated because establishing 
specific causal links between a GHG emitter and a particular harm caused 
faces significant scientific limitations, due in part to the fact that harms 
caused by GHGs are dispersed globally rather than locally.  Consequently, 
                                           
79
 For a general discussion of procedural issues raised by international climate change litigation, 
including venue and standing, see generally Andrew L. Strauss, The Legal Option: Suing the United States 
in International Forums for Global Warming Emissions, 33 ENVTL L. REP. 10185 (2003), available at 
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 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS §6 (2002). 
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 David A. Grossman, Warming Up to a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate Change 
Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 27 (2003).  In the alternative to a negligence claim, an action based 
in the tort of public nuisance may alleviate some of the causation problems associated with negligence tort 
claims.  See, e.g., Donna Green & Kristy Ruddock, Could Litigation Help Torres Strait Islanders Deal 
With Climate Impacts?, 9 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 23, 27 (2009).  
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all emitters contribute to some extent to all impacts, thus necessitating a 
proportional liability scheme determined by morality and policy, rather than 
merely science and law.82  For example, liability could be based on “a 
source’s total emissions, or only on those emissions in excess of some 
‘optimal’ level;”83 on the basis of “average or marginal impact of 
emissions;”84 on the basis of current or cumulative/historic emissions;85 or 
on current or projected harms.86 
Substantive complications under international and tort liability law 
would have greatly hampered the Tuvaluan claim before the ICJ.87  First, 
Tuvalu would need to prove that the applicable law here, tort liability, is a 
general principle of international law.88  Then, to prove its tort claim, Tuvalu 
would need to demonstrate that the United States and Australia owed a duty 
of care to the island nation, but breached that duty.  The most obvious 
obstacle would be that Tuvalu would need to establish a causal relationship 
between Australia and the United States’s excessive GHG emissions, and the 
harm caused.89  Moreover, Tuvalu would need to determine appropriate 
damages.  Because the “law of torts attempts primarily to put an injured 
person in a position as nearly as possible equivalent to his position prior to 
the tort,”90 constructing a world based on behavior in which the two 
countries conformed to the requisite duty of care would likely be purely 
speculative, due to the complex scale of such a scenario. 
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 Daniel A. Farber, Apportioning Climate Change Costs, 26 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 21, 40 
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 See Jacobs, supra note 63, at 117. 
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2. Tuvalu Would Face a Number of Procedural Legal Hurdles in a Tort 
Liability Claim Brought Before the ICJ 
In addition to the substantive defects the Tuvaluan case would have 
likely encountered, there would have been a number of procedural hurdles 
the country would have encountered at the ICJ.  Primarily, the Tuvaluan 
lawsuit would not have been successful against both countries in the ICJ 
because the ICJ would not have had jurisdiction over the United States in the 
matter.  For a state to bring a case before the ICJ, the court must have 
jurisdiction over all state parties.91  Jurisdiction is primarily established by:  
1) state consent (“compulsory jurisdiction of the court”), 2) mutual consent 
between the parties involved, or 3) authorization via treaty.92  While the ICJ 
would have been an appropriate venue for a lawsuit against Australia, given 
that it accepts the court’s jurisdiction without reservation,93 jurisdiction over 
the United States would have been problematic and unlikely.94  Thus, Tuvalu 
would have been precluded from bringing suit before the ICJ against the 
United States. 
C. Though Developing, Human Rights Frameworks Are Currently 
Insufficient as an Effective Basis for International Climate Change 
Litigation  
The clarification and progression of human rights should complement 
existing legal strategies in the climate change legal context, but the human 
rights framework cannot stand alone in helping to secure compensation for 
SIDS like Tuvalu.  The application of human rights frameworks to SIDS 
experiencing negative climate change impacts may take place in two ways:  
first, conventional human rights can be invoked to support claims of rights 
                                           
91
 See, e.g., International Court of Justice: Contentious Jurisdiction, http://www.icj-
cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1 (last visited Jan. 24, 2010). 
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infringement experienced by victims of climate change;95 and second, 
evolving human rights can be clarified and then applied to support such 
claims of rights infringement.96  SIDS have been active proponents of both 
the utilization and development of rights-based frameworks in response to 
climate change.97 
From a SIDS perspective, efforts to utilize conventional human rights 
theories could rely on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.98  For 
example, Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides 
that “no one shall be denied their nationality.”99  In 2007, Tuvalu’s Prime 
Minister Apisai Ielemia stated “the climate change impact . . . is an 
infringement of our fundamental rights to nationality and statehood, as 
constituted under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other 
international conventions.”100  Surely, any forced relocation events due to 
climate change (e.g. rising sea levels and inundation of land) implicate 
challenges for sovereignty, statehood, and nationality. 
More progressive approaches to the application of human rights 
attempt to recognize and strengthen the link between climate change and 
human rights by advocating for and codifying a human right to a safe or 
clean and secure environment.101  One source of such a right could be the 
1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment which states, 
“[m]an has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate 
conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity 
and well-being, and he bears a solemn responsibility to protect and improve 
the environment for present and future generations.”102  Using this example, 
adverse consequences of climate change would be a violation of the rights 
guaranteed under a broad interpretation of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration 
on the Human Environment. 
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Advocates of this second approach point to the law’s development and 
practice using current illustrations:  for example, Marc Limon notes that the 
first explicit attempt to draw the connection between human rights and 
climate change occurred in 2005 when the alliance of Inuit filed their 
petition with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.103  Another 
major step of progress in developing this link occurred on March 28, 2008, 
when “the Maldives, along with seventy-eight co-sponsors from all regional 
groups, secured by consensus the adoption of the United Nations Human 
Rights Council Resolution 7/23 on ‘Human Rights and Climate Change.’”104  
This was heralded as the first instance of official U.N. recognition via 
resolution that climate change has immediate “implications for the full 
enjoyment of human rights.”105  Professor John Knox106 adds another 
important element to the development of the link between human rights and 
climate change.  Knox notes that in January 2009, the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (“OHCHR”) examined the 
relationship and determined that climate change does threaten an array of 
human rights, but that it does not necessarily violate human rights.   
However, human rights law creates duties on states concerning climate 
change and those duties include an obligation of international cooperation.107   
What is the function of developing an applicable human rights 
framework?  In discussing the benefits of a rights-based approach to climate 
change, Limon observes that “[h]umanizing climate change . . . creates an 
ethical imperative to act that can with time translate into legal 
obligations . . . .”108  Limon further asserts that a contribution that human 
rights principles can make to climate change policy is the emphasis on 
“accountability mechanisms, including . . . access to administrative and 
judicial remedies, and . . . emphasis given to procedural rights such as access 
to information and access to decision-making . . . .”109  Finally, Limon notes 
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that the rights-based framework approach may emphasize international 
cooperation in addressing climate change.110 
While the significance of such developments in the context of 
broadening the human rights framework cannot be overstated, the narrow 
application of such significant steps should not be ignored.  Knox illustrates 
a concept expressed in the OHCHR report, that human rights law places 
duties on states that are relevant to climate change even in the absence of 
explicit recognition that climate change violates human rights, with the 
following analogy:  “[a] mudslide not caused by a state may not be a 
violation of human rights law, but that law may still require the state to take 
steps to protect those in its path.”111  This statement highlights a 
characteristic of traditional international human rights law:  international 
human rights law places upon states duties to their citizens.112  This 
characteristic is a fundamental roadblock in the application of international 
human rights to cross-border and global problems such as climate change.113  
A recent breakthrough in the international human rights framework, 
however, can be found in the OHCHR report’s assertion that a state’s duties 
are not merely limited to national application:  “states have an international 
duty to cooperate in order to realize human rights.”114  Knox admits that this 
breakthrough is extremely contentious, given that developed states resist the 
idea of extraterritorial human rights duties.115  Its actual contribution to 
climate negotiations remains unclear, and Resolution 10/4 adopted in 
response to the OHCHR report does not reference the report’s cooperation 
provision.116  While countries such as the Maldives pushed for inclusion of 
the stronger cooperation language, many developing countries disagreed 
with its inclusion, to the final detriment of the strength of Resolution 10/4.117 
Thus, the clarification of a human right to a secure environment does 
not by itself provide an accessible mechanism for compensation for all 
climate change-induced adaptation strategies.  The rights-based dialogue is 
not yet developed enough to be practical for the particular adaptation context 
faced by worst-case scenario island nations.  Indeed, Limon admits that we 
are no closer today to approaching a breakthrough in clarifying an explicit 
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right to a safe and healthy environment than we were in 1972.118  Likewise, 
he admits that such a right would face some shortcomings in its contribution 
to addressing climate change impacts, especially where responsibility for 
harm lies beyond the victim state’s borders.119  Therefore, the discussion of 
rights-based progression should not occur to the detriment and exclusion of 
the progression of other more timely and appropriate legal mechanisms for 
worst-case scenario countries such as Tuvalu.  Rather, multiple approaches 
to addressing climate change and providing redress for climate change 
victims should be viewed as complementary.  Pursuing redress under other 
existing legal mechanisms, such as the principle of unjust enrichment, 
should complement current efforts both to mitigate the impacts of climate 
change and to advance a human right to a safe and secure environment. 
IV. UNJUST ENRICHMENT LITIGATION MAY BE THE BEST LEGAL THEORY 
AVAILABLE TO CLIMATE CHANGE VICTIMS  
In light of the failure of tort liability-based litigation and the 
insufficiency of rights-based approaches, unjust enrichment may be the best 
legal theory available to climate change victims.  The principle of unjust 
enrichment is a general principle of international law, and can thus be 
applied at both international and state levels.  Unjust enrichment may be 
used as an independent basis of liability when a defendant has been enriched 
at the plaintiff’s expense, and thus the principle may be particularly useful to 
SIDS. 
A. The Principle of Unjust Enrichment Is a General Principle of 
International Law 
The principle of unjust enrichment exists at both international and 
domestic levels.120  In international law, the principle of unjust enrichment 
enables a state to lodge a complaint against another state for recovery of 
money or property on the ground that the other state has enriched itself at the 
first state’s expense without legal justification.121  General principles of 
international law “are among the sources of national and international law 
which have long been recognized and applied in disputes between 
states . . . [and] are . . . expressions of national legal systems, 
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and . . . expressions of unperfected sources of international law.”122  Unjust 
enrichment can be characterized as a general principle of international law 
under Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the ICJ.  Arguably, unjust enrichment 
was applied in Lena Goldfields,123 Chorzów Factory,124 and ADC v. 
Hungary,125 and by the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal between 1983 
and 1987,126 to name a few examples.  In domestic courts, the practice of 
unjust enrichment can vary somewhat.  Under English common law, for 
example, the elements of an unjust enrichment claim require receipt of a 
benefit, enrichment at the plaintiff’s expense, unjust retention of the benefit, 
and consideration of whether the defendant had a defense.127  Similarly, 
forms of unjust enrichment are recognized in civil law countries.128  Thus, 
because the principle is recognized broadly, it may be considered a general 
principle of international law. 
B. Unjust Enrichment May Be Particularly Useful to SIDS Because the 
Principle May Be Used as an Independent Basis of Liability When a 
Defendant Has Been Enriched at the Plaintiff’s Expense 
The principle of unjust enrichment is particularly relevant to SIDS 
because plaintiffs may be able to pursue a claim based in unjust enrichment 
as an independent basis of liability when a defendant has been enriched at 
the plaintiff’s expense.  Moreover, as a gap-filling legal device, unjust 
enrichment may have a particular role for SIDS where a relationship exists 
between GHG emissions and their associated benefits to emitter countries on 
the one hand, and the negative consequences of those emissions on the other.   
The climate change-related problems facing SIDS cannot be easily redressed 
by other traditional legal categories (such as tort, contract, or property law), 
and thus unjust enrichment may fill that liability gap. 
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1. The Principle of Unjust Enrichment Can Be Used as an Independent 
Basis of Liability 
Plaintiffs may be able to pursue a claim based in unjust enrichment as 
an independent basis of liability when a defendant has been enriched at the 
plaintiffs’ expense.  The principle of unjust enrichment reflects the moral 
tenet that one person should not obtain unfair advantage at another’s 
expense.129  Further, unjust enrichment originated as a gap-filling legal 
theory when traditional legal categories (tort, contract, and property law) 
were insufficient mechanisms to secure recovery for a legal wrong.130  Using 
the English common law model from the United States, for example, the 
Law of Restitution and supporting case law have developed three elements 
necessary for a successful claim based in unjust enrichment:  1) an 
enrichment must accrue to the defendant, 2) the enrichment must occur at 
the expense of the plaintiff, and 3) the enrichment must be unjust.131  Such a 
claim “must also survive any countervailing defenses or considerations.”132  
With respect to the first element, the definition of “enrichment” may be 
broadly construed.  One approach is to “identify an enrichment as something 
positive, [for example], an accretion of wealth.”133  The second element 
focuses on the connection between the enrichment and the plaintiff’s loss.   
This connection is most obvious when the defendant derives a gain by 
causing loss to the plaintiff.134  However, the connection is sufficient even 
when the defendant is not the cause-in-fact of the loss.  For example, the 
defendant need not be the actual wrongdoer, but merely retains the benefit 
conferred by the plaintiff’s loss.135  Finally, with respect to the third element 
a plaintiff must prove for a claim of unjust enrichment, the proffered 
enrichment is considered unjust when “a defendant’s retention of the benefit 
at [the] plaintiff’s expense would offend notions of fairness or equity.”136 
In response to a plaintiff claiming damages based in unjust 
enrichment, a defendant may attempt to invalidate the plaintiff’s allegations 
of injustice where, on balance, the benefits accrued by the plaintiff outweigh 
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the enrichment gained by the defendant at the plaintiff’s expense.137  
However, this defense has its weaknesses, regardless of its legal validity.  In 
evaluating this defense in the case of indigenous peoples and multinational 
corporations, one authority declared: 
[M]erely producing a positive economic effect in a country may 
not mitigate sufficiently the unjustness to the indigenous 
peoples who bear the primary burden of the investment without 
receiving any of the benefit . . . .  [T]he retention of a benefit 
obtained at the expense of a largely defenseless group would 
seem to offend notions of “good conscience” and, therefore, be 
precisely the activity against which the unjust enrichment 
doctrine is designed to protect.138 
Thus, the principle of unjust enrichment is uniquely insulated from the most 
likely defense it would face in litigation:  offsets for benefits received by the 
plaintiffs. 
2. The Principle of Unjust Enrichment in the Climate Change Context Is 
Particularly Compelling for SIDS 
The principle of unjust enrichment may, therefore, have a role for 
victims of climate change in SIDS:  anthropogenic emissions of GHGs by 
specific nations are irrefutable, and the subsequent problems facing SIDS 
cannot be easily redressed by other traditional legal categories such as tort, 
contract, or property law.  The scenario is ripe for application of unjust 
enrichment.  For example, the first element of an unjust enrichment claim, 
that an enrichment must accrue to the defendant, is satisfied in the Tuvaluan 
context.  Emitter countries have accrued wealth and economic development 
by developing industries that contribute to GHG emissions with few 
restrictions.  
The second element, that the enrichment must occur at the expense of 
the plaintiff, is also satisfied in the Tuvaluan context:  the wealth and 
economic development enjoyed by the people in countries such as the 
United States and Australia accrued to the detriment of SIDS’ land (both 
biophysically and geographically)—to the extent that the island nations must 
seriously consider permanent relocation for their entire populations in order 
to ensure survival.  The important point here is that unjust enrichment does 
not require that the plaintiff demonstrate his “expense” was due to the guilt 
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of a particular wrongdoer defendant—it only requires a showing that the 
defendant has been enriched.139  This allows the relationship among the 
parties to be somewhat attenuated:  SIDS may establish a relationship as 
plaintiffs to defendant emitter countries by relying on available scientific 
analyses supporting GHG emissions and rising sea levels, and they may 
establish a relationship between emitters (both past and present) and the 
defendants—the people now living in these countries and enjoying their 
enriched economic status—by linking the identities of the defendants 
through long-lived entities, such as existing governments and the people 
they represent.140  In other words, the defendants benefit, a third party emits, 
and the plaintiff loses.  Thus, unjust enrichment is intrinsically appropriate 
for climate change litigation because of its inherent ability to avoid the 
requirement that the defendant cause the plaintiff’s injury, and its ability to 
instead focus on the benefits retained by the defendant.  
Finally, the third element for a claim of unjust enrichment, that the 
enrichment must be unfair, is also satisfied in the Tuvaluan context.141  
While citizens of the United States and Australia enjoy a relatively high 
quality of life as a result of each country’s emissions,142 Tuvaluans must 
contemplate submerged lands and the loss of their status as a nation.  That 
Tuvalu may lose its ability to determine the location and future of its people 
due to the conduct of big emitters is strikingly unfair.  Thus, not only is the 
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third element of a claim for unjust enrichment satisfied, but it is likely that a 
defense challenging the “unjustness” of the enrichment would fail.143 
3. Potential Obstacles Facing Tuvalu in Applying Unjust Enrichment 
May Be Overcome 
For Tuvalu to prevail under a claim of unjust enrichment, several 
obstacles would have to be overcome.  Tuvalu would have to consider the 
most appropriate venue in which to bring such a claim, it would have to 
strategically determine how to characterize the parties to the claim, and it 
would have to navigate sovereign immunity obstacles.144  
Tuvalu would first have to determine in which venue to bring a claim 
against an emitter for unjust enrichment, and how to characterize the parties.   
The venue could include the ICJ, other international tribunals, or domestic 
                                           
143
 Daniel Farber has advocated for the application of an unjust enrichment paradigm to the context of 
climate change victims.  Farber explains that a number of injuries experienced by climate change victims 
are appropriate for the application of the paradigm because injuries “involving changes in basic geographic 
characteristics such as sea level . . . are readily identifiable, do not raise the complicated causation issues 
that plague other potential forms of damages, and can be measured (at least roughly) in a fairly 
straightforward way.”  Daniel A. Farber, Basic Compensation for Victims of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1605, 1607 (2007) [hereinafter Farber, Basic Compensation for Victims of Climate Change].  Farber 
explains that three categories of harm fit the profile of appropriate injuries for redress under a 
compensation scheme: harm to natural systems that react strongly to temperature changes (such as coral 
reefs and thus also to the fisheries they support), harm related to sea level rise (and thus by extension to 
related coastline diminishment), and harm related to changes in water availability (and thus to adaptation 
measures taken to combat the impacts of those changes).  Id. at 1610-13.  However, while Farber appears to 
be advocating for the application of unjust enrichment, his analysis is framed in terms of “causation,” 
“harms,” “liability” or “culpability,” and “damages.”  See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, The Case for Climate 
Compensation: Justice for Climate Change Victims in a Complex World, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 377, 389-94 
(2008) [hereinafter Farber, The Case for Climate Compensation].  Such language is typically associated 
with tort law.  Ultimately, Farber presents a moral responsibility argument for the reasons why emitter 
countries should take responsibility of their own past and future emissions, regardless of the actions or 
contributions of other emitter countries; however, the distinction between tort principles and the principle 
of unjust enrichment in Farber’s analysis remains somewhat unclear.  
144
 Additionally, the parties, and ultimately the tribunal, would need to determine the amount awarded 
in damages.  Unlike compensatory damages, which focus on the plaintiff’s loss, the focus of damages 
calculation in unjust enrichment is on the defendant’s gains.  ELAINE W. SHOBEN, WILLIAM MURRAY TABB 
& RACHEL M. JANUTIS, REMEDIES, CASES AND PROBLEMS 808 (Foundation Press 3d. 2002).  The climate 
change context raises difficult issues in measuring the defendant’s gains (monetarily) at the plaintiff’s 
expense.  While Daniel Farber has suggested that a strict liability approach to the U.S.’s contribution to 
climate change since 2004 would amount to $4.5 trillion, this would be subject to reduction based on the 
amount of harm (in dollars) the U.S. has done to itself through its climate change contributions, subject to 
reduction based on offsets by other emitters, and on the proportion of harm to a particular recipient (e.g., 
Tuvalu) rather than the whole world.  Farber, The Case for Climate Compensation, supra note 143, at 406.  
As of October, 2010, it appears that no one has attempted to calculate a plaintiff country’s loss due to 
climate change for purposes of calculating unjust enrichment damages (this could include the profit gained 
by polluting in ways that contributed to climate change).  The lack of access to such information introduces 
another practical problem with the unjust enrichment approach. 
MARCH 2011 UNJUST ENRICHMENT IN THE CLIMATE CHANGE CONTEXT 453 
  
courts,145 while the parties could include the State of Tuvalu and any number 
of emitter states.  The answer to both questions, however, hinges on the 
concept of sovereign immunity.  Generally, “the immunity of a state from 
the jurisdiction of the courts of another state is an undisputed principle of 
customary international law.”146  The restrictive theory of sovereign 
immunity holds that “a foreign nation’s immunity does not apply to claims 
arising from the nation’s private or commercial acts, but protects the nation 
only from claims arising from its public functions.”147  Other than the 
exception presented under the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, the 
only way the doctrine can be circumvented is by waiving or submitting to 
jurisdiction.148 
One glaring option for Tuvalu to avoid sovereign immunity issues is 
to sue emitter countries at the ICJ that submit to the ICJ’s compulsory 
jurisdiction, such as Australia, under the theory of unjust enrichment.  The 
other, more complicated, option is to sue any country (including those that 
do not submit to compulsory jurisdiction before the ICJ) in either the ICJ, or 
in a (most likely Tuvaluan) domestic court.  One possible outcome with the 
latter option would be that the defendant country would submit to 
jurisdiction if it felt confident Tuvalu would not prevail, in an effort to shut 
down litigation once and for all.  Such an outcome would likely fail to 
produce damages for Tuvalu, but would still function to further the political 
discussion for developing a monetary mechanism which would compensate 
climate change victims.  In the alternative, Tuvalu could try to creatively 
engineer a strategy using the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, and 
demonstrate that all or some portion of the actions taken when the emitter 
country was emitting would satisfy the commercial exception to sovereign 
immunity.  Much work on the particular logistics and strategies under a 
theory of unjust enrichment is needed; however, the applicability of the 
theory is highly relevant to the climate change context in Tuvalu. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Legal remedies for climate change victims continue to elude 
proponents of tort liability and human rights.  While tort liability-based 
litigation in the climate change context encounters substantial substantive 
and procedural problems, the application of human rights frameworks are 
stymied by a slowly evolving link between climate change and human 
rights.  For countries such as Tuvalu, pressure is mounting to find an 
alternative legal mechanism that may help produce the resources necessary 
to adapt to climate change at a minimal loss to their lands and livelihoods.  
Unjust enrichment may be used as an independent basis of liability when a 
defendant has been enriched at the plaintiffs’ expense, enabling the plaintiffs 
to avoid specific proximate cause, cause-in-fact, and sanction requirements 
associated with torts, and the legal obligation and enforcement problems 
associated with the process of developing and clarifying human rights law.   
Thus, the principle of unjust enrichment has the potential to be particularly 
useful to Tuvalu and other SIDS in the climate change context. 
